1665-1666: the winter campaign
WINTER OPERATIONS
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As with the previous winter campaign, very little reference to that of winter 1665/6
can be found in the literature. Bruijn mentions Evertsen's winter campaign only
very briefly.100 De Jonge, the most complete account, informs us that from January
to mid-February 1666 Cornelis Evertsen the Elder (now Lieutenant-Admiral)
commanded a winter fleet in the North Sea and off the Flemish coast. T his had
been planned at 36 ships of 24-40 guns, but the admiralties' 'sluggish delibera
tions', frequent difficulties and the outright opposition of some admiralties to the
original well-laid plan - particularly those of Holland - resulted in it 'disappearing
in smoke'. Because of this, opportunities to inflict real damage on the British were
probably lost. Nonetheless, Evertsen forced an 'intolerable' situation on the British,
but was later forced to retreat by a far superior British force.101 Fox briefly adds the
intriguing information that in January (Old Style) Evertsen led his substantial
force into the mouth of the Thames but implies that he was forced to withdraw
that same month by an 'unexpectedly large' English 'winter guard'. These large
forces also immediately throw doubt on Fox's own view, abovementioned, of the
two navies' use during winter. Recently, Roos has given a very brief account of
these events, adding that Evertsen had 13 ships.102 All of this requires qualification,
revision and expansion.
Despite the scant literature, with the Zeeland and other sources we can again
reconstruct much of the 1665-1666 winter campaigns course. This was similar in
respects to that of 1664-1665, but was perhaps more aggressive - not least because
the weather did not interfere as it had done with Banckert's last sortie in February
1665 which illustrates the large role of luck in war. Unlike that of 1664-1665,
though, the winter fleet of 1665-1666 was entirely a Zeeland-Amsterdam affair.
Roos states that the campaign plans stipulated eight Amsterdam ships, but that
there was no subsequent mention of their taking part. He also stresses De Jonge's
account of the difficulties caused by inter-provincial jealousy at this time, as well
as - apparently confirming Amsterdam's absence - a Zeeland States letter to the
States General of May 1666, where the former emphasised that Zeeland was the
only one of the five admiralties that had kept its men in pay and its ships in action
during the previous winter.103 This position needs drastic revision: the Zeeland
admiralty resolutions themselves show that seven Amsterdam ships served with the
winter fleet, and name six of the Amsterdam captains.104
Conditions were different from the previous year. The main campaign only ended
in early November 1665, when the huge main fleet was finally sent home and the
various admiralty contingents returned to their respective bases aside from a
squadron under Isaac Sweers active until late November. On the fleet's return the
trade embargo was relaxed partially, and then only briefly for vital trades not
in thrall to British geographical advantage: merchantmen were allowed out for one
voyage to Norway or the Baltic (both crucial for naval supplies); they were to
return before the end of the year. These stipulations kept the pressure on naval
resources (for convoy escorts) down as much as possible, but still stretched those
resources when most admiralties were extremely pressed financially and their ships
in need of refit: the fleet had been in service from spring 1665 - some ships since
