32
WINTER OPERATIONS
considered dangerously exposed by the British naval command - it had to be with
drawn 60 miles to the south-west, to the inner anchorage at the Buoy of the Nore
(at the confluence of the Thames and Medway). There was also an invasion scare:
Arlington confided that for the past week
we have been alarmed with a considerable squadron of Holland ships, lying before Ostende, in order
to some great design.135
Louis XIV came in at last on the Dutch side, declaring war on 26 January. For the
British, the great fear now was of a combination of Evertsen's ships with a large
army assembling near the French coast under Marshall Turenne. The warning
beacons on the British coast were readied and the militia put on alert in Essex and
12 other maritime counties.136
Time was running out quickly. On 24 January the main British winter force of 23
sail, composed largely of capital ships, was ordered to assemble at the Downs and
be ready to sail to the Dutch coast by 13 February: Vice-Admiral Sir Christopher
Myngs Swiftsure66) with 12 other ships (10 were third- and fourth-rates) and Sir
Thomas Teddiman Unicorn63) with nine other ships.13 Dutch intelligence of
the move - which put the force at 20 'frigates', a very serious underestimate - led
to instructions on 18 February for the Rotterdam admiralty to ready all her ships.138
It was, however, far too late for any help to arrive in time.
As for Evertsen's withdrawal, in fact, it was as late as 19 February that Evertsen's
squadron of 13 warships spotted the vastly superior British winter force of 35-36
sail under Myngs (now in Fairfax60); the encounter took place off Ostend. By 11
February Myngs had arrived in the Downs from Portsmouth; he then had 25 ships
and built up his numbers quickly in the next few days - he was 28-strong on 16
February. Myngs went to Ostend to attack Evertsen twice. On the first occasion,
on receiving reports from his scouts, he left the Downs at noon on 14 February,
but found the Dutch had gone; he returned on 16 February. Myngs left the Downs
for the second time on 18 February and anchored off Nieupoort that night. At
dawn the following day he was lucky to find himself within 9 miles of Evertsen's
squadron. In the face of overwhelming odds Evertsen was very naturally forced to
run back to the safety of the Scheldt, though he retreated in good order. The
British seized back the initiative, 'having chased 16 Hollanders into Flushing',
noting that the Dutch ships were good sailers.
Meanwhile, five ships that had sailed from off Ostend to join Evertsen (but failed
to meet him) were still at sea; these caused some concern especially when, on 21
February, the British occupied the former Dutch position off Ostend. They stayed
there only briefly, but Evertsen was now thrown totally onto the defensive all that
could be done was to send back out the despatch yachts West-Souburg (Frans
Rooijs) and Dishoek to warn shipping that the British were out in force; Dishoek
was sent as far as Solebay and West-Souburg to Dunkirk to look for Evertsen's five
missing ships. The Zeelanders asked Rotterdam to send out two of its own light
craft to help, but the result is unclear. Nonetheless, Evertsen's squadron was re-
supplied and stood ready. Over 22-23 February all five of the missing ships
returned, avoiding the very powerful British force by only a few days. The last ship
