12
WINTER OPERATIONS
were not used in winter, what were the more numerous third-rates doing? Here, we
now know that the two progenitors of the larger-type two-decker third-rate,
Fairfax and Speaker of 1650, were originally designed specifically as flagships of the
winter force.26 Winter deployments were therefore their raison d'être and clearly
pivotal to the design of these ships, the ancestors of the two-decker '74' - the two-
deck 74-gun workhorse battleship of the eighteenth century. Originally carrying
50 guns (increased to a formidable 60 by 1655), in the main campaigns of 1665
and 1666 Mary {ex-Speaker) bore 58 and 63 respectively.27 Dutch intelligence in
winter 1664-1665 consistently put her armament at 66 (see Appendix 3). Such
ships cannot be regarded as small, and this type was growing more powerful (see
Table 1), and would continue to do so.
Winter deployments, then, were responsible for this stage in the evolution of
design, but we know nothing of the size of the forces apart from, in the war of
1652-1654, the large fleets engaged at Dungeness and Portland: 52 British and 70
Dutch; 84 British and 79 Dutch, respectively. Frank Fox asserts that, for the British
under Charles II (1660-85), even in wartime it was customary to lay up all but a
small 'winter guard".28
Returning to our focus here, the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Fox also refers specifi
cally to a winter naval 'hibernation during the war of 1664-1667:
Neither side thought it wise to expose its fleet to the storms of winter; as if by mutual consent, both
navies withdrew to their harbours as the cold months approached.1''
It has also been said that at this time the Dutch 'battlefleet was laid up for the win
ter'.30 Yet the nineteenth-century naval historian De Jonge mentioned - albeit very
briefly - that Dutch fleet operations were carried out in the winters of 1664-1665
and 1665-1666.31 Recently, Doeke Roos mentioned the former campaign and gave
a very brief outline of the latter.32 It seems that the only appreciable piece dealing
with (Dutch) winter operations in some detail dates back to 1930 and covers the
winter of 1653-1654 - prompted by the loss of 10 warships in a storm at the Texel,
9-10 November 1653; a national disaster comparable with the heavy defeats in
battle earlier that year.33
Further back, before 1646, the Dutch kept a portion of their fleet in winter service
in order to maintain their blockade of the Flanders ports34 a particularly difficult
task because of the lines of shoals off the coast. This winter effort was largely in
vain: the blockading force was routinely withdrawn during the winter in the
1640s.35 Even during the most active period, 1637-1644, the blockade could be
enforced only during April-October and even then severe weather meant
blockading forces had to withdraw from their stations. As a result, over 40% of
the Dunkirkers' prizes were taken during winter: over twice the summer figure.36
At that time Dutch ships were still small and therefore more suited to winter
operations, yet in the war of 1664-7 larger ships, both cruisers and capital ships,
were risked in large numbers during winter, and sometimes used here on the
Flanders coast (albeit they used a forward anchorage here and were not on the
more difficult task of blockade). Nonetheless, Boxer emphasises the risks of these
