18
WINTER OPERATIONS
The combatants were unsure of how exactly to use their naval forces and how their
opponent might use his - further complicated by the difficulty of getting accurate
intelligence.62 Reflecting this, and also the over-confidence with which the British
had provoked the war, at the Dutch winter fleet's inception Ambassador Downing
thought its purpose was merely 'to amuse the King, and to keepe you in allarme,
and that you may not thinke of their designes against you elsewhere and so
in the Spring laugh at you.'63
The British were kept guessing as to its purpose: in late December James was
concerned that the squadron might go down the Channel with an outbound
convoy, or in order to bring back the Smyrna merchant fleet. The British soon
received intelligence that the Zeelanders' target was near the Isle of Wight; their
move, it was thought, would be a fireship attack on Sandwich's winter squadron,
then assembling off Portsmouth.64 It had already been suggested that eight war
ships go to the north-east coast James was worried about the vital east coast coal
trade, and the frigate Mermaid (28) was alone on station: 'if any of the States' ships
should go that way, she will have a hard task of it'.65 The Dutch position was direct
ly to the east and a short distance from the Downs, both a principal merchant
anchorage and a main war anchorage (albeit with certain drawbacks): it was
unguarded at that time. There was a wide choice of options:
Everson may go out or send out what number [of ships] he thinkes fitt when he thinkes fitt
upon any advices or intelligences that he shall receive of hopes of snapping any shipps either
Men of warre or others in the Downes or thereabouts or of Colliers from Newcastel or any from the
Sound when the weather will permitA
The main force under Evertsen seems to have mostly held in or near the Wielings:
his movements in the short-term are uncertain, though we know something of his
precautions. A small Dutch detachment took an advanced position to the west,
most likely to warn against British warships coming from Portsmouth: from early
January two of Evertsen's ships conducted night patrols off the Strait of Dover.67
The Zeelanders were now contributing extra ships to the winter fleet: the fast
Vissers Herder was later on this western deployment, but was unable to leave
Zierikzee for some days because of ice.68 From mid-January, two of Evertsen's ships
made night patrols in the mouth of the Scheldt - to secure the Scheldt against
attacks through the northern and easterly approaches, such as the Oostgat, which
could not be seen at night from the Wielings. The frigate Schakerloo (Jan
Crijnssen) conducted night patrols in the Veerse Gat.69 It was Banckert who was
given the aggressive missions: he led detachments on three successive sorties into
British waters, with progressively larger numbers of ships. The first of these
missions was the 'frigate' attack, before the winter fleet was fully assembled, and
was a purely Zeeland affair.
