Banckert's third sortie; 'Blind Man's Bluff'
22
WINTER OPERATIONS
The soldiers were landed; the ships were hurriedly repaired at Flushing - their leaks
stopped and caulked.83
Banckert was ordered out again on 30 January; Evertsen was to hold ready in the
Wielings. The soldiers for Banckert's ships were re-embarked on 2 February; he
sortied yet again on 5 February in still greater strength, with more ships allocated
from Evertsen. This time Banckert had 12 warships, at least half were Zeelanders;
'an advantageous exploit' was planned.84 News of his departure leaked out rather
slower than before: the Dutch increased security through the issue of secret orders.
Downing reported Dutch confidence that Banckert would 'do some notable
exploit' and that he had gone north as no British warships were thought to be in
the area. In that case his target would again be the vital colliers. It was also likely
that he was after a squadron of eight warships about to be detached to that area
of the coast, to protect the coal trade (especially after having being chased by a
similar force on his first sortie). This was only one of the British fears, but they
cancelled the deployment. (Indeed, after the sortie, Banckert was said to have
admitted that he had been seeking battle with seven British warships he knew had
been sent northwards.) He was even rumoured, on both sides, to be bound for
Cadiz, whilst British intelligence postulated his going north-about Scotland to join
De Ruyter and wreak havoc in the Caribbean.
Banckert's orders comprised two objectives: the primary mission was to raid
the Downs, the secondary to attack the coal trade. The primary objective was
the greatest British fear: the two earlier humiliating raids off the North Foreland
pointed directly to such a new attack and stung the British into action; by 27
January they decided to move their 'winter guard' to the Downs, where it arrived
on 6 February - just one day after Banckert sailed. Many were capital ships (see
Appendix 3). This left only a very brief window for surprise, but the primary
mission was not carried out: it seems (according to Boreel) that it was cancelled
due to the inexperience of the Holland pilots in the Downs area.85
The arrival of the British completely changed the situation Banckert was now in
some danger as he was outnumbered by Sandwich by 16 ships to 12. Detailed
naval intelligence from Cunaeus in England was, as usual, sent to the Griffier at
the States General; this naturally delayed its receipt in Zeeland, but the cold also
contributed to the time-lag. (It was a hard lesson: from now on, naval intelligence
was also sent direct to Zeeland.) On its arrival, the delayed news of the British
move caused urgent action: fast despatch yachts were needed to search for Banckert
and deliver his new orders to execute his mission 'with all prudence and consider
ation without hazarding his squadron' or else rejoin Evertsen in the Wielings.
(This limited information reached the British through the usual espionage
channels, after some delay - but Banckert's actual objective was still unknown.)86
Unfortunately, the Zeelanders were then very short of despatch yachts. There was
just one at this time - the hurriedly converted prize Zoutelande (4); the second only
entered service on 10 February.87 Auxiliaries had to fill the gap in assets: three Veere
fishing pinks were hired for the search.88
