WINTER OPERATIONS
23
North of Dogger Bank on 9 February, Banckert's squadron was hit by a storm:
two Holland ships were dismasted and had to be sent back, reducing the force to
10 ships. Pieter Bronsaart's Drie Helden Davids (44, Noorderkwartier), lost her
bowsprit and foremast and had to be towed back by Jan van Campen's Luipaard
(54, Rotterdam). They returned to Zeeland on 12 February. Neither ship took
any further part in the winter operations.89 Banckert received his new orders by
14 February at the latest. He had gone north to Flamborough Head and
Scarborough, where the squadron caused some panic on the coast. (The size of his
force was exaggerated, but it is not yet clear whether this was due to excited' cor
respondents or whether Banckert had been joined by a large number of priva
teers.)
Unbeknownst to the Dutch, a large part of game had already been given away by
loose talk at the Vlacke - before the sortie. On 4 February the Rotterdam captain
Crijn van der Kerkhoven hosted a dinner aboard Wapen van Rotterdam (42),
attended by a Frenchman, Jean Baptiste du Tiel. Van der Kerkhoven told his guest
that the Dutch would raid the Downs early on 8 February, as well as detailing the
current Dutch dispositions. On 7 February Du Tiel reached the Downs and gave
this intelligence in person to Sandwich and his senior captains. The council of war
agreed to hold in the Downs and 'be as ready as we can'.90 Banckert's attack though,
as we saw, had been called off. On 11 February Dutch warships were reported to
the east of the Goodwin. Sandwich moved out to the North Foreland, meeting
four reinforcements. Now 21-strong (see Appendix 3), he sent out three of his five
lightest frigates to scout, bur found no trace of the Dutch; Banckert's two cripples
may have had a narrow escape. On 17 February, intelligence arrived in Zeeland
that Sandwich would be out 'within a very short time' with 20 ships.91 He actual
ly came out again from Margate road on 16 February, 18-strong, to a forward posi
tion south of the Galloper. Detaching two of his largest ships for refit London76,
and Montagu, 66), he shifted his flag into Revenge (58). It is significant that
London was a second-rate - a r/we-decker: the current historical position, as we
saw, is that these giants were not used in winter before 1692. On 18 February new
orders arrived to intercept the Dutch on their return south 'we have a brave fleet
at sea to find them out'.92 Now given more freedom of action, and with at least 10
more reinforcements (see Appendix 3), Sandwich came some distance east before
turning on the following day and reaching a position probably near the Kentish
Knock.93
On 20 February Evertsen was in the forward position at the Schooneveld with 20
ships; even at this late stage the Dutch still had superior numbers, had Evertsen
and Banckert been concentrated. Sandwich's squadron, however, went north for
the more convenient forward anchorage at Solebay, reaching it the following day.
They came out again on 23 February. From Sandwich's journal it is not clear how
far east he sailed in attempting to cut Banckert off, but Sandwich was reported to
have swept up the Flanders and Dutch coasts from off Nieupoort, two of his scouts
reaching at least as far north as Goeree. What distance he was from the coast and
how he missed Evertsen is unknown, though the weather was often appalling.
Nonetheless, Sandwich's sweep lasted just two days and would have left much time
and space on the eastern side for Banckert to slip through.
