24
WINTER OPERATIONS
The British superiority over Banckert's detached squadron would grow steadily
after about two weeks as more ships were fitted out and sent to join Sandwich.
Sandwich was reinforced by at least two ships whilst at sea; a storm and gales with
snow on 25-27 February were so bad that two large newcomers - Fairfax (58) and
Newcastle (48) had been in company with Sandwich for two days before he was
even aware of their presence. Resolution (58) lost her bowsprit, foremast and main
topmast; many British warships were losing masts in the extreme weather at this
time.94
The Dutch very much feared that Banckert would be defeated by Sandwich's
superior force. The precise movements of Banckert's and Evertsen's squadrons for
most of this time are still unclear. Nonetheless, all the available light craft were sent
out to look for Banckert. After some days of urgent activity including repairs to
the flagship Hof van Zeeland on 21 February Evertsen took his squadron (report
ed variously at 15-18 ships, but including the Zeeland capital ships Vlissingen,
Middelburg and Utrecht) out of the Schooneveld to try to join Banckert.95
In the meantime more storms hit Banckert's squadron and dispersed it; snow
storms on the English north-east coast were the worst in living memory.'"' Banckert
finally returned with seven ships on or just before 27 February, seven days overdue.
His squadron may even have been seen from the Suffolk coast around this time; he
seems to have just slipped past Sandwich, who had been out again but hit by a
snow storm and was back in the Downs by chance on the same day that Banckert
returned. Banckert's remaining three ships had been separated and endured espe
cially severe snow storms for 10 days, but these including the Zeelander Adriaan
de Hase in Wapen van Zeeland (36) - returned soon after the rest on 28 February.
The cost was high: more than half the ships had been badly damaged, whilst the
crews suffered severely from the weather and sickness.97 Despite the weather, one
prize was taken on the third sortie a Scots ship laden with salt.98 Fundamentally,
although the weather hindered an engagement, a meeting was possible in one of
the lulls. Both sides blundered about unaware of exactly where the other was, and
the outcome of any engagement could have been calamitous for either side. The
Dutch, superior if concentrated, could have been defeated in detail. For either side,
the loss of 10 or even 20 ships at this stage of the war would have had disastrous
strategic consequences: a full fleet engagement the following summer with that
kind of deficit might have lost the war.
The Dutch winter fleet dispersed in early March, despite the Zeelanders' opposi
tion. 14-strong at their maximum, they remained in the Wielings; the other admi
ralties' ships returned home the 12 Amsterdam ships arriving back at the Texel
on 9-11 March, with another two (admiralty unspecified) by 12 March. Opposite,
the British now had 25 ships, which quickly increased by 10 March to 44 sail.99
In total, however, the British already had 43 ships in service in southern North
Sea bases by the end of February, though some of these were under repair after
damage earlier in the winter (see Appendix 3). This excludes any ships operating
in the Channel. The winter threat to the British had ended; it was now a race to
prepare for the main campaign.
