26
WINTER OPERATIONS
summer 1664 besides the strain of simultaneously building what was, effective
ly, half of a completely new fleet. Demobilising ships and paying off their crews,
of course, saved huge costs in the short-term.
Another enormous difficulty was the Bishop of Miinster's lightning invasion in the
eastern Provinces: the Dutch army had to be quickly strengthened, mercenaries
hired, allies procured and subsidised further straining Generality financial
resources and placing more pressure on those admiralties more dependent on
federal contributions from the eastern Provinces. Delfzijl and the Ems estuary were
under threat from Mtinster (a British seaborne attack was also feared): the
Friesland admiralty, mostly demobilised, needed Amsterdam's help with their
defence. Amsterdam was also saddled with the protection of the briefly opened
Norway and Baltic trades; these were vulnerable to a large British naval force of 18
warships escorting their own trade for naval supplies at Gothenburg. Amsterdam
was also left with the task of bringing back any remaining VOC 'retourschepen'
from Norway.
These factors were to severely disrupt Dutch preparations for the winter. The first
independent initiative for a new winter fleet came from the Amsterdam admiralty
in October 1665 - even before the end of the main campaign; nine Amsterdam
ships had already been allocated for winter service as early as August. It was, how
ever, the Zeeland deputies pressing in the States General for a winter fleet as early
as 2 November that started the ball rolling; they urged for a force of no less than
48 ships, but a projected 36 were agreed. This was again appreciable when com
pared with a projected main fleet for spring 1666 of 72 capital ships and 12 frigates
the winter fleet was to be 43% of the next main fleet's numbers. After such a long
and exhausting campaign in 1665 (as was recognised in the initial proposal), it is
perhaps not surprising that discussions rumbled on in the Committee for
Maritime Affairs and Haagse Besognes, also over a crucial measure to keep the
crews in pay. The likely damage due to bad winter weather, shortage of ships due
to losses in the main campaign, shortage of money, and delays to the main spring
fleet that would necessarily ensue as a result of forming the winter fleet were all
cited as reasons not to set it out. The Zeeland deputies pressed again for a decision
on 3 December, but it was not until 19 December that it was finally decided to
hurriedly send out as many of the 36 ships as possible. Only now were the crews
ordered to be retained. It was all too late. The winter fleet decision seems to have
been on the intervention of the Holland deputies at the behest of the Amsterdam
admiralty. The latter seems frustrated at being loaded with the tasks sketched above
and the lengthy deliberations; it was clearly committed to the winter fleet - send
ing no escorts to the Sound and ignoring a late Holland States instruction to send
three warships to patrol the entrance to the Kattegat. This goes beyond the simple
Holland-Zeeland rivalry so often painted; something was happening within the
Holland States and admiralties that needs further exploration, but this is beyond
our scope here. The last issues to be resolved were the fleet base and command: the
Zeelanders had naturally wanted the winter fleet to be based in the Wielings and
Cornelis Evertsen the Elder to command it. The former was agreed, but the States
General - curiously, or perhaps not so left the issue of command unresolved.105
This time the composition of the winter force was stipulated in some detail: 36
