WINTER OPERATIONS
27
frigates of 20-36 guns (see Table 3). There were no capital ships projected - most
probably to allow for the much greater emphasis on capital ships (including the
new construction) in the main fleet planned for spring 1666 - more powerful than
that of 1663. Another possibility is the experience of the use of capital ships dur
ing the previous winter campaign - for example, the severe damage to Drie Helden
Davids (50) - though this needs investigation.
Table 3. Dutch Winter Fleet, as planned, December 1665
Ships
Guns
Men
12
32-36
150
12
24-30 (32)
125
12
20-24
100
The Amsterdam winter contingent was planned at 12 ships;10 the Zeeland con
tingent six.108 All were frigates, as specified (see Appendix 4). Details are not yet
available, but those of the other three admiralties must also have been planned at
six ships (as per the usual contingent proportions mentioned above).
Plans are one thing; implementing them quite another. Three of the four hard-
pressed smaller admiralties did not supply their winter contingents at all: Friesland
seems to have demobilised most of its ships very quickly in late 1665. The
Noorderkwartier seems to_have done similarly: though at least one ship was still
in service in December, it too was unable to set out any winter ships.109 Yet some
thinly-cloaked opposition to the whole idea is very apparent - apart from the
administrative shenanigans above. In early January after the fact Rotterdam
pleaded that the severe frost delayed the fitting-out of their winter contingent, but
also - tellingly - repeated the 'the winter fleet would delay the spring main fleet'
argument, also that any ships employed during the winter would undoubtedly
return badly damaged' and also that they had lost five capital ships in 1665.
Rotterdam asked to be excused from supplying any ships to the winter fleet.110
Firstly, Rotterdam lost four capital ships, not five, in 1665; perhaps related, the
admiralty had already inflated the status of two ships she had lost subsequently that
year.111 The precise ice conditions are as yet unclear, but the bad weather argument
was exaggerated and a mere pretext particularly when the capital ship most
recently lost, Wapen van Rotterdam (46, Crijn van der Kerkhoven, he of the care
less words in January 1665 above), was lost by accident in fine weather, due
to incompetence. But, ultimately, this was all academic - there was now no possi
bility of manning the warships even had they been ready: as in Friesland and the
Noorderkwartier, most of the Rotterdam crews seem to have already been paid off
by the time of the long-delayed instruction to retain them.
In another feature of winter 1665-1666 distinguishing it from the previous year,
after the main fleet's return, privateering was allowed for almost four months until
the end of February 1666 matching the planned end of naval winter operations
and to make their crews available for the main fleet in the spring. Privateers, unlike
the winter fleet, were not confined to home waters and were now able to operate
in richer areas from French and Spanish bases. Excluding prizes sent in there,
