30
WINTER OPERATIONS
Zeeland admiralty. The detailed results of this meeting are not yet clear: the
Zeeland Vice-Admiral, Banckert, took overall command, and later handed over to
Evertsen. The Amsterdam ships were under Hugo van Nieuwenhof Middelburg
36),126 promoted to temporary Rear-Admiral: this made him still clearly junior to
all three Zeeland flag officers, so that the issue of overall command must have been
a mere formality. As for operational unity, in late January the Amsterdam admiral
ty ordered Van Nieuwenhof not to take the Amsterdam contingent into the
Channel and to have the ships back at the Texel by the end of February.127 These
orders are matter-of-fact and do not represent inter-admiralty dissension: whilst
the plans just agreed in conference are not yet available, any movement into the
Channel proper risked being easily cut off from base (any superior British force
in the North Sea simply had to move to the Strait of Dover). The section on
returning to the Texel was in line with the original time limits put on the winter
fleet's operations.
The winter fleet was 18-strong in major warships.128 This force including
Matthijssen's ships still in the north was composed of three Zeeland capital ships,
eight Zeeland frigates (see Table 4), and seven Amsterdam frigates (see Appendix
4). To these we can add three or four Zeeland despatch yachts. The Dutch also
took a more advanced position in the southern North Sea: whilst Matthijssen's
squadron went north, after early January the frigates Zeeridder and Westcappel
cruised off Ostend; Zeeridder seems to have been in action on 23 January, when
one of her soldiers was killed, but the circumstances of any engagement are a
mystery.129 These two ships were also scouting out what was soon to be a bold
Dutch forward anchorage that was very close to the enemy, and also (as we saw
above) in waters that the Dutch had not been able to hold in winter during the
1640s.
Banckert flew his flag in Vlissingen (Simon Block) from 12 until 26 January, then
in Dordrecht (Adriaan de Hase) for another five weeks until the end of February.130
He led the squadron out of the Deurloo for Ostend on 17 January. The Vice-
Admiral missed 50 British merchantmen going out of the Downs on the following
day, but his squadron was still weak and it is not clear how large the British escort
was. Newly-arrived and returning ships joining on 18-19 January made his
squadron only some 11-strong. Evertsen was in Middelburg at the admiralty coun
cil on 19 January planning the coming expedition. On 26 or 27 January (and not,
as De Jonge has it, at the beginning of January) Evertsen joined the squadron, tak
ing over command from Banckert; Evertsen's flag was in Hof van Zeeland not, as
Roos asserts, in the brand-new 70-gun Walcheren (which was still some months
away from completion). The British knew that Banckert had sailed from Flushing
and that the Zeelanders were concentrating their ships. By 31 January there was
news of 15-20 Dutch warships off Ostend with a good easterly wind behind them:
'we shall finde whether they hold the resolution they are discoursed to have of
coming Westerly'. This was promptly reported to be indeed the case and that
Evertsen was in command.131 Evertsen seems to have had 13 major ships, but is
often reported as 16-strong - a persistent discrepancy in Evertsen's numbers that is
probably due to the inclusion of his light craft. At the end of January the Dutch
off Ostend were reported as many as 41- to 42-strong: privateers and merchant-
