Conclusion
WINTER OPERATIONS
33
back in was the Amsterdammer Jan Gyselsz. van Lier {Vollenhoven)1 his brought
the squadron back up to 18 ships.
Evertsen made his report in Middelburg on 22 February. From Rotterdam came
belated news that 10 warships would be ready around mid-March; Amsterdam had
no ships ready to send but suggested that as the British had gone, this opened a
safe way home for its winter contingent. Over 27-28 February the decision was
taken to disband the winter fleet: the seven remaining Amsterdam ships sailed for
the Texel on or just after 1 March (when Evertsen received instructions to send
them home). The 11 Zeelanders came in to clean and begin preparations for the
main campaign; Evertsen went to the Flague on 7 March for its planning.""
We have seen that, although operational narratives and analyses of the great naval
battles and campaigns of the seventeenth century are long-established, we knew
very little about winter naval campaigns between the leading powers even during
one of the most important naval wars in a period of rapid development. The two
winter campaigns covered here are clearly of some consequence. Far from navies
being completely demobilised for the winter, or only insignificant numbers of
ships fitted out, the two navies' winter forces were maintained - or at least planned
- at levels of around one-third to as high as half of those currently planned for
the 'main campaign season' (though plans for the coming spring were, naturally,
sometimes increased during the winter). This level of commitment is far from
negligible and demands more attention to and examination of other wartime
winters. Similarly, the involvement of large numbers of capital ships shows that
apart from the few very largest ships - the leading naval powers were willing to risk
many of their principal battleship assets, as well as their cruisers, during the severe
weather of the winter season. In two consecutive winters, the British were initially
slow off the mark, but had deployed more ships in the North Sea than the Dutch
by the end of the season. These shifts suggest that the transitions from winter
to the 'main campaign season' and through to the following winter also require
examination.
These winter campaigns were 'quiet' only in the sense that there were no full naval
engagements, only skirmishes. Nonetheless, they were extremely tense times, full
of much concern, fear, and some panic the winter campaigns were just as much
full of cat and mouse' and 'fog of war' as any other time of the year; the numbers
of warships involved were indeed smaller than in the main campaignbut the risks
due to weather so much greater. Some morale and propaganda value was shown.
Successful attacks were made on the vital English east coast coal trade. We have
seen the counterfactual 'What If?' in early 1665: if the Dutch winter fleet had dealt
a powerful blow in early 1665 (Banckerts third sortie), what would have been the
effect on British opinion - starting the war with a bloody nose? Only narrowly was
an engagement avoided, and only by chance. Flad one been fought, either side
could have lost a large number of ships, with consequences for the balance of naval
strength in the summer. Equally, Evertsen in early 1666, given more luck, could
